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Abstract: 
 
The International Monetary Fund spends most of its time monitoring its member states’ 
economic performance and advising on institutional change. While much of the literature sees 
the Fund as a policy enforcer in ‘emerging market’ and ‘frontier’ economies, little attention has 
been paid to exploring the Fund’s bilateral surveillance of its Western member states. This 
article proposes that ‘seeing like the IMF’ provides a dynamic view of how the Fund frames its 
advice for institutional change. It does so through ‘associational templates’ that do not blindly 
promote institutional convergence, but appeal for change on the basis of like-characteristics 
among economies. Many Western states, particularly small open economies, consider the 
Fund’s advice as important not only for technical know-how, but because Fund assessments 
are significant to international and domestic political audiences. This article traces the Fund’s 
advice on taxation and monetary reform to two coordinated market economies, Denmark and 
Sweden, and two liberal market economies, Australia and New Zealand from 1975 to 2004. It 
maps how the Fund advocated ‘policy revolutions’ and ‘policy recombinations’ during this 
period, advice that coincided with important institutional changes within these small open 
economies. 
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INTRODUCTION1 
The Fund’s surveillance comprises the core of its mandate and is central to its contemporary global role. 
The Fund’s main decision-making body, the Executive Board, now spends approximately sixty per cent of 
its time discussing economic surveillance (Van Houtven, 2002: 15), and most staff members spend the 
majority of their time working on surveillance-related activities (Pauly, 1997: 41). As Harold James 
observes: ‘The rule of Bretton Woods has been replaced by knowledge’, with the Fund’s surveillance 
exercises creating an ‘information standard’ to replace the dollar standard of the Bretton Woods era 
(1996: 612; cf. Best, 2005: Ch. 6). However, international political economy scholars have paid 
surprisingly little attention to exploring the Fund’s bilateral surveillance of its non-borrowing, industrialized 
member states (for one recent contribution, see Momani, 2006). This article seeks to address this gap in 
the literature on the Fund by mapping the evolution of the Fund’s bilateral surveillance of and advice to 
Western states. 
 While the Fund is most commonly known for its role dealing with ‘emerging market’ and 
‘frontier’ economies, it also spends a significant amount of its time conducting bilateral surveillance of 
institutional change in Western states. The Fund’s advice is not always influential, nor can it always act 
autonomously. As with Fund conditionality in loan programs (see Momani, 2004), major powers like the 
US sometimes seek to use Fund surveillance of non-borrowing states as a tool to achieve their own 
strategic ends. For instance, the US Treasury has recently made calls for the intensification of multilateral 
analysis in the Fund’s bilateral surveillance to identify global exchange rate imbalances (read: US--China 
trade deficit) (Adams, 2006). The UK has also supported multilateral surveillance to further ‘transparency’ 
(King, 2006). 
 These recent examples indicate that the Fund’s surveillance role continues to be deemed 
important by its dominant member states. However, as the literature on the Fund’s relations with its 
borrowing member states suggests (Stone, 2002), we can expect the Fund to exhibit greater autonomy 
from major power interference in countries that are of less systemic or strategic importance, such as the 
cases of the small open economies we explore here. Other scholars have shown that non-major power 
Western states consider change within the Fund to be important, as evidenced by their competition for 
influence on the Fund’s Executive Board (Woods and Lombardi, 2006) and by their commitment of the 
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scarce time of national officials to talk with Fund staff (Pauly, 1997: 41). We identify three main reasons 
for why Western states might consider the Fund’s bilateral surveillance and advice to be important: 
 
(1) The diffusion of technical knowledge. States consider the Fund to have an advantage in 
comparative knowledge of institutional change, because the Fund regularly monitors institutional 
experiments across all its member states. 
 
(2) Signalling to an international audience. If the Fund gives a negative assessment of a non-
borrowing country it may affect its credit rating and financial markets. Fund membership legally 
obligates states to explain their economic policy choices and states risk being ‘shamed’ before 
their peers in Executive Board discussions. 
 
(3) Signalling to a domestic audience. Fund assessments may be used by domestic political actors to 
claim support for or to criticize a particular policy stance, and may be used by officials to argue for 
institutional change or maintenance in bureaucratic contests.  
 
 Following the introduction of the second amendment to its Articles of Agreement in 1978, 
which charged the Fund with exercising ‘firm surveillance’ over its member states’ exchange rate policies, 
the Fund has gradually expanded its surveillance role over a wide range of economic policies and 
institutions in all its member states (James, 1996: 270--6). As an international organization often seen as 
being at the forefront of globalization, commentators often impute the notion that the Fund has a ‘one size 
fits all’ model of how economies should reform to become more institutionally efficient (Woods, 2001; 
Feldstein, 1999; Stiglitz, 2002). The Fund, as we demonstrate below, does have a clear view on how 
economies can become more institutionally efficient, but the standard depiction of policy homogeneity 
blinds us to how the Fund has ‘templates’ for different types of economies, which leads to variation in the 
analysis and data that is generated through each Fund mission. The point here is that the Fund does not 
send staff missions to its member states simply to gather economic data, which is then transmitted to the 
Fund management and Executive Board as an unmediated snapshot of a country’s economic 
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circumstances. Rather, country missions allow the Fund staff to interpret a country’s current economic 
circumstances and institutions by learning directly from national officials (Harper, 1998: 120), the actors 
who actually ‘work at the coal face’ with institutional experimentation. We should therefore view the staff 
reports that are produced from Fund missions not as photographic representations of how a country’s 
economy works, but as a descriptive interpretation by the staff that builds an analytic picture of what is 
going on in an economy and generates advice on how institutions may be improved. Templates provide 
the Fund staff with basic tools for thinking through how an economy can be ‘fixed’ through constant 
tinkering over time. As such, there is no pre-determined end point of an ‘ideal IMF economy’ that a 
mission team will push in their dialogue with a Western member state; instead, staff members use a 
combination of ‘IMF friendly’ policies and associational templates to assist an ongoing process of 
institutional change.  
Templates, as we see them, must be associational rather than universal. They are a reflection of how 
the Fund views an economy within groups of like-units (often with a member state’s encouragement),2 
rather than the Fund imposing a homogenous template as a universal stamp of authority. Templates are 
generated by the institutional memory stored in the Fund’s country desks in coordination with its policy 
departments. In this manner, the Fund’s ‘world’s best practice’ policies are commonly framed within 
associational templates – by comparing a state’s policy stance with alternatives from states that the Fund 
sees as confronting similar challenges – to have greater legitimating force.  
 The claim in this article is straightforward: by assessing institutional change through the 
eyes of the IMF, we can gain a dynamic picture of how states were advised to revolutionize or recombine 
economic policies. In this sense, ‘seeing like the IMF’ may provide a unique insight into the slow gestation 
of institutional change over time. This does not mean that we should uncritically adopt its judgments but, 
rather, that the Fund’s advice provides an important means of monitoring change over time in economies 
that are often viewed as exhibiting a more or less ‘fixed’ system.  
Our wish to ‘see’ like the IMF is inspired by James C. Scott’s Seeing Like a State (1998). Scott 
emphasizes how the creation of technical knowledge requires a ‘narrowing of vision’ (1998: 78), a 
process of abstraction and simplification that by increasing the legibility of a society increases the 
capacity of policymakers to design formal institutions to shape social behavior. While Scott sees a 
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perfectly legible and transparent society as impossible to realize in practice (1998: 80), his work invites us 
to recognize that how an authority sees an economy will shape its advice on what policymakers should 
tinker with to improve institutional efficiency. Scott’s catalogue of errors on how the way states see their 
societies permits them to plan institutional change therefore holds two key points of relevance for how the 
Fund sees its member states (1998: 3). First, the way the Fund sees an economy is only intended to 
represent the slice of economic activity that interests the Fund. While this narrow focus is usually put 
forward as a trenchant criticism of the Fund, it is, after all, a result of the restricted focus that its founding 
member states built into the organization. It is also the basis for the ‘scientific’ authority of the Fund’s 
advice (Barnett and Finnemore 2004: 67--8), and is efficient given the Fund’s (increasing) resource 
constraints. Second, how the Fund sees its member states’ economies informs how it seeks to remake 
their institutional frameworks over time, especially in conditions where the Fund staff can persuade 
policymakers to see new institutional challenges in the same way as they do. Exploring how the Fund 
sees its member states’ economies may therefore allow us to understand how an existing institutional 
framework becomes defined as a problem, how the causes of the problem are diagnosed, and how 
advice on potential institutional solutions is generated. 
The Fund is often seen in a negative light as an organization that seeks primarily to impose Western 
(and especially ‘Anglo--American’) policy standards on the rest of the world. While such arguments retain 
analytical purchase at low levels of magnification of the Fund’s activities, we should also consider that the 
Fund might be engaged in learning from states about their own institutional experiments to build its stock 
of comparative policy knowledge, rather than simply promoting institutional convergence. As this study 
shows, an important component of the Fund’s work is to diffuse knowledge about institutional experiments 
among its non-borrowing Western members – especially among those within the same associational 
template – and this is a role which the Fund often performs at the behest of states themselves.3 
To assess how the Fund has sought to promote institutional change, this article compares its advice 
on taxation and monetary reform to small open economies. The article uses primary source material from 
Fund archival documents to compare advice given to what are considered to be two ‘liberal market 
economies’ (LMEs), Australia and New Zealand, and two ‘coordinated market economies’ (CMEs), 
Denmark and Sweden, from 1975 to 2004 (Hall and Soskice, 2001). By commencing our study of the 
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Fund’s advice to these four states in 1975, we incorporate the period in which the Fund sought to reinvent 
itself to maintain its relevance in the post-Bretton Woods era, after it had been ignored during many of the 
key events of the early 1970s (Pauly, 2006: 10). Taxation and monetary issues are targeted because they 
can be expected to represent the extremes of how national economies change over time, and constitute a 
vital part of the domestic policy nexus that shapes how states engage the international political economy 
(Seabrooke, 2006a). Taxation is typically assumed to exhibit strong elements of national path 
dependence that prohibits harmonization despite a purported ‘race to the bottom’ (Hobson, 2003), while 
monetary policy can be coordinated among actors to achieve integration and an international consensus 
on exchange rate flexibility (McNamara, 1998). 
Comparing Fund advice to these Nordic and Australasian economies is of particular interest because 
these economies have changed both rapidly and gradually during the thirty-year period of our study, and 
especially because the Fund has little coercive power to make policymakers in these countries do 
anything against their will (Schäfer, 2006: 75). We do not argue that the Fund is the only, or primary, 
cause of institutional change in the states under investigation. Indeed, we find that Western states are 
sometimes willing to ignore Fund advice. We do suggest that in these four cases: a) actors consider Fund 
assessments as potentially important signals for their domestic and international audiences; b) actors do 
seek comparative knowledge from the Fund to lessen their own transaction costs about how to achieve 
policy reforms; and, from a) and b), c) how the Fund sees states is important to how actors frame 
potential policy reforms, placing boundaries on the ‘thinkability’ of different policy options, especially with 
regard to a state’s integration into broader economic processes of regionalization and globalization. 
These factors are especially prominent during a period of domestic economic uncertainty and crisis, or 
when the Fund judges that a state has ‘below average performance’ compared with states that share 
similar circumstances.  As with its borrowing member states, it seems plausible that in a crisis the Fund’s 
advice to small open economies might help to ‘tip the balance’ in favour of ‘IMF friendly’ reforms 
(Vreeland, 2003: 13--14), especially if there are ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ among a country’s 
policymaking community who are willing to work with the Fund to achieve institutional change (Woods, 
2006: 73). An important caveat here is that it is difficult to substantiate the independent causal effect of 
the Fund’s advice to Western states in the absence of the coercive sanctions that are observable when 
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states are dependent upon Fund resources. As such, our conclusions here are only intended to be 
suggestive, and further work is required to test their validity.  
The article proceeds as follows: first, we discuss how seeing like the IMF can provide important 
insights into tracing economic reform over time, including the notion of templates, which provide tools for 
achieving institutional change. Second, we provide a range of ‘IMF friendly’ policy mixes for taxation and 
monetary reforms and assess their frequency in reports produced from the regular consultation exercises 
between the Fund staff and national officials in the four economies in question, and in the minutes of the 
Fund’s Executive Board discussions. This information provides an insight into when, and on what, the 
Fund advised our small open economies to engage in what we refer to as ‘policy revolutions’ or ‘policy 
recombinations’ to achieve institutional change. Third, drawing on the frequency of ‘IMF friendly’ advice, 
we assess policy revolutions and policy recombinations in the Australasian LMEs from 1975 to 2004. 
Fourth, we do the same for the Nordic CMEs. Finally, we reflect on how ‘seeing like the IMF’ provides a 
dynamic picture and enhances our capacity for counterintuitive insights into how small open economies 
have dealt with economic globalization in the post-Bretton Woods era.  
 
I: SEEING LIKE THE IMF AND ASSOCIATIONAL TEMPLATES 
One of the main complaints against the Fund is that the organization embodies an overly narrow and 
technocratic approach to understanding its member states’ economies, which leads it to inappropriately 
promote policy harmonization (Öniş and Şenses, 2005; Momani, 2005, 2007; Leaver and Seabrooke, 
2000). In contrast, we suggest that the Fund’s dialogical process of consultation and negotiation can help 
produce the necessary (though not by themselves sufficient) ideational conditions for institutional 
bricolage. This constitutes a process of evolutionary path-dependence, where institutional change is 
constrained by the range of existing institutional materials that actors have available to them in a given 
situation, suggesting that new institutions will usually have some degree of continuity with those they 
replace or transform (Campbell, 2004: 70). Here actors may respond to new challenges by translating 
Fund advice for ‘IMF friendly’ institutional reforms into their particular national context and recombining 
Fund advice with a state’s existing institutional fabric over time (Crouch, 2005: 154). If the Fund has a 
broader view of institutional diversity across countries than its critics have acknowledged, this may also 
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help to highlight areas of concern for institutional change that are difficult to see when it is assumed that 
the Fund’s agenda is geared exclusively towards encouraging institutional convergence.  
When a state faces crisis conditions, or when a government is seeking to improve ‘below average’ 
economic performance, national officials may see the Fund as a vital source of expertise that can provide 
international comparisons on appropriate policy options. In such circumstances, the Fund can provide a 
ready source of institutional ‘roadmaps’, and can supply officials with comparative knowledge of reform 
outcomes elsewhere. This is not to imply a straightforward causal link whereby the Fund is able to 
determine the direction of economic reform. Rather, we want to suggest that the Fund can be an 
influential source of ideas for institutional change by shaping the range of alternative choices that 
policymakers have at hand (see Chwieroth, 2007). 
It is certainly true that there is a great deal of commonality among Fund policies, to the extent that we 
can sensibly discuss an ‘IMF friendly’ policy mix, but universality is often overstated, especially because 
there is little follow-up on tracing policy implementation over time. Seabrooke (2006b) and Broome (2005) 
suggest that it is more common for the Fund to compare neighboring states, states within a region, or 
states that share common economic characteristics when evaluating and promoting specific institutional 
innovations. The Fund therefore constructs what we term associational templates in order to customize 
‘IMF friendly’ advice to its member states. Templates are created according to, most commonly, regional 
types, but also according to the membership of international organizations. Fund staff reports and 
Executive Board meeting minutes commonly use signifiers like ‘Asian’, ‘Anglo Saxon’, ‘OECD’, or ‘EU’ to 
create templates for different kinds of economic systems rather than a universal model (Seabrooke, 
2006b; on the ‘European economy’, see Rosamond, 2002). Such associational templates also provide 
legitimizing devices on why a member state should see the Fund’s seemingly universal policy mix as 
appropriate for its own context.  
We find that the supply of new policy ideas and institutional innovations between the Fund and its 
member states is a two-way street, at least in the case of the Fund’s policy dialogue with Western states. 
Our analysis of Fund archival documents and interviews suggests that national officials see the Fund as 
having an advantage in comparative knowledge of policy reform. Other scholarship has also noted this 
point, but has found that the Fund does not convey its comparative policy knowledge to member states 
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(Momani, 2006: 265), while the Fund’s biennial review of its surveillance exercises has highlighted the 
desirability of incorporating comparative analysis more systematically into its policy dialogue with national 
officials (IMF, 2004: 19). We find from our study of these four cases that the Fund does use cross-country 
comparisons in how it sees individual states, and that it does convey relevant comparative policy 
knowledge to national officials in some cases.  
 
II: IMF FRIENDLY REFORMS 
The Fund annually conducts Article IV consultations with its member states to assess their economic 
performance. In addition, Fund staff conduct surveys, compile statistics, and conduct research on all their 
member states – not only ‘emerging market’ and ‘frontier’ economies. Within the Fund, Article IV 
consultations are communicated through staff reports written by members from the relevant area and 
policy departments (see Harper, 1998: Ch. 9). These reports detail current economic developments and 
trends, areas of concern in the economy and, importantly, staff appraisals detailing what should be 
reformed. Staff reports commonly compare an economy according to templates. The Fund’s Executive 
Board then comments on these reports, with a staff representative on the state under discussion also 
present. The archival materials provide a clear means to trace Fund advice to our chosen small open 
economies over a thirty-year period. 
In order to trace Fund advice over time to Australia, Denmark, New Zealand, and Sweden, we have 
coded Fund staff reports from Article IV consultations and subsequent Executive Board meetings for the 
frequency of ‘IMF friendly’ taxation and monetary reforms. As we have targeted certain types of reforms 
on taxation and monetary policy, our assessment of frequency is qualitative and context-sensitive rather 
than quantitative word recognition. On taxation we can consider an ‘IMF friendly’ mix to be coded as 
follows: 
  
 Suggestion of increase in indirect taxes (primarily VAT) (+2, -2). 
 Suggestion of reduction of trade and transaction taxes (+2, -2). 
 Suggestion of broadening of direct taxes (income) (+2, -2). 
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For example, if the Executive Board proposed that the state should introduce a consumption tax, that it 
should reduce tariffs, and that it should ‘broaden’ income taxes this would represent 6 points. If the staff 
also advised the same then we would receive a total, and maximum, 12 points. As we can see from 
Figures 1--4, this is rare.  
On monetary systems we can consider an ‘IMF friendly’ mix to be coded as follows: 
  
 Suggestion of floating rate reform (+2, -2). 
 Suggestion of public debt decrease (+2, -2). 
 Suggestion of interest rate liberalization (+2, -2). 
 
If the Executive Board advised a state to change to a floating rate, to decrease its public debt, and to 
liberalize interest rates then on monetary systems we would have 6 points. If the staff advised the same 
then a maximum 12 points is obtained. This, as our figures show, is not common.  
 At first, Figures 1--4 provide an overly complicated story of the frequency of ‘IMF friendly’ 
advice from the Fund to our four chosen states. However, upon closer inspection we may notice some 
clear differences among them. As we can see, the Fund is particularly vocal about New Zealand in the 
late-1970s and early-1980s, as well as, less frequently, Australia in the late-1980s and 1990s. In 
comparison, the Fund’s advice to Denmark and Sweden is less frequent but persistent. We separate the 
moments of high frequency as indicators of potential ‘policy revolutions’, whereas persistent but lower 
frequency advice is tinkering that seeks to foster ‘policy recombinations’. Together, high and low 
frequency, revolutionary and recombinant, Fund advice seeks to build institutional efficiency.  
On tax reform, where the range of possibility on the y axis is +/-12, New Zealand is notable for the 
Fund’s promotion of a policy revolution in the late-1970s and 1980s, particularly as the high frequency of 
‘IMF friendly’ advice in the latter period corresponds with sweeping ‘neoliberal’ economic reforms. 
Australia is also a candidate for policy revolutions, especially during moments in which major changes to 
revenue, such as the introduction of a consumption tax, were under debate. For Denmark the story here 
is of interest given the lack of advice and the fact the Fund also contradicts our ‘IMF friendly’ policy mix. 
Change here is more often recombinant than revolutionary. Similarly, Sweden has received a relatively 
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constant level of advice, and here the Fund wants income tax reduction rather than seeking to install a 
new taxation system.  
On monetary reform we have a remarkable amount of similarity after 1994. Once again the range of 
possibility on the y axis is +/-12. Our figures immediately suggest that perhaps monetary systems are 
easier to successfully integrate than taxation systems, which speaks volumes on what aspects of the 
economy are more politically sensitive and path dependent under economic globalization. Still, New 
Zealand stands out as a state where the Fund frequently advocated a policy revolution in the late-1970s 
and 1980s. There are also key moments for policy revolutions in Australia, in Sweden (primarily over the 
reduction of public debt), and in Denmark (primarily over putting the budget in surplus). In the following 
sections we separate policy revolutions and policy recombinations within the two LME Australasian and 
two CME Nordic economies, with some unanticipated results. 
 
[Figures 1, 2, 3, and 4 about here] 
 
III: THE IMF AND AUSTRALASIAN ECONOMIES 
On some measures, such as tariff walls, the Fund saw Australia and New Zealand as comparatively 
‘closed’ market economies at the start of our study. In the 1970s, both Australia and New Zealand were 
under the jurisdiction of the Fund’s European Department along with Sweden and Denmark, but in 1992 
Australia and New Zealand were reassigned to the Southeast Asia and Pacific Department (renamed the 
Asia and Pacific Department from 1997), suggesting a change in the Fund’s classificatory schema. Many 
of the tax and monetary changes that occurred in both countries during the fifteen-year period after 1983--
4 were broadly similar in nature, but there were nonetheless clear differences in how Australia and New 
Zealand were viewed through an Australasian (or an ‘Anglo Saxon’) template. These differences between 
the Fund’s view of Nordic and Australasian economies were reflected in the pace, scope, and style of 
reforms in Australia and New Zealand to enhance their institutional efficiency (for comparisons of 
economic reform in Australia and New Zealand, see Castles et al., 2006; Hazledine and Quiggin, 2006).  
 In its relationship with Australia prior to 1983 and with New Zealand prior to 1984, the Fund 
urged governments to adopt similar reforms on taxation and monetary policies, seemingly without much 
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success. The Fund wanted governments to restructure the fiscal balance from ‘direct’ taxation (on 
personal income and company profits) toward ‘indirect’ taxation (on consumer goods); to broaden and 
decrease the progressiveness of income taxation; and to shift from import licensing and other quantitative 
trade barriers to tariff barriers, then to lower tariffs over the medium-term. The Fund argued that these 
changes would improve economic competitiveness, improve institutional capacity to adjust to a new 
external environment following the oil price shocks and the shift away from fixed exchange rates in the 
1970s, and improve the state of public finances that had deteriorated as the rate of economic expansion 
slowed (IMF, 1977, 1978a, 1979, 1980).  
 On the reform of monetary institutions, from the mid-1970s the Fund wanted Australia and 
New Zealand to shift to a more flexible exchange rate regime and to liberalize interest rates, as well as to 
decrease the size of their ballooning public debt (IMF, 1979, 1983a, 1983b). After both governments 
moved at the end of the 1980s to adopt monetary frameworks based on achieving and maintaining low 
inflation, the Fund encouraged them to enhance the institutional efficiency of their central banks by 
making their decision-making processes more ‘transparent’. The Fund argued this would increase their 
capacity to communicate their credibility to international and domestic audiences (see Bell, 2002; Dalziel, 
1993; Lu and In, 2006). The Fund also sought to diffuse New Zealand’s 1989 institutional innovation of 
setting an explicit ‘inflation target’ to Australia (IMF, 1991a). Australia incrementally translated this 
innovation to match its own particular circumstances, setting an implicit inflation objective from 1993 as a 
‘central tendency’, to be achieved on average over the business cycle, rather than a rigid inflation ‘range’ 
like New Zealand (IMF, 1996a). Despite the broad similarities in the advice on tax and monetary reform 
that the Fund promoted in both New Zealand and Australia, the Fund’s view from staff reports and 
Executive Board meeting minutes suggests that the promotion of ‘IMF friendly’ institutional reforms was 
pushed more rigorously in the New Zealand case than in the Australian case. Moreover, the strength with 
which arguments were delivered ebbed and flowed over time, and the Fund’s advice switched to 
strengthening governments’ resolve to ‘stay the course’ once they had embarked upon the Fund’s 
preferred direction of institutional reform.  
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Policy revolutions 
In New Zealand, the Fund’s most frequent advice for the adoption of new institutional solutions occurred 
at the beginning of the 1980s (see Figure 1), when the country faced chronic ‘stagflation’ caused by 
historically high levels of unemployment and inflation. In particular, the Fund wanted to see a broadening 
of the tax system as a way of moderating wage claims, as well as a shift from quantitative trade 
restrictions such as import licensing to a more liberal system of qualitative tariffs (IMF, 1981a). With 
economic indicators worsening during 1982, the Fund criticized the government’s adoption of tight 
controls on wages, prices, and interest rates as well as its refusal to devalue the nominal exchange rate 
to combat inflation, and urged the government to reduce the rapidly increasing level of public debt. In 
terms of the government’s stated goal of reforming the tax system, the Fund favoured the adoption of a 
broad-based consumption tax, but recommended that policymakers ‘raise the community’s awareness’ 
about what it saw as a policy trade-off between either reducing taxes or maintaining ‘long-standing social 
preferences for income equity and high levels of welfare’ (IMF, 1983a). As with the other countries in this 
study, the Fund’s evaluation of New Zealand was not based solely on bracketing out domestic political 
and social concerns from the ‘economic distortions’ and ‘misallocation of resources’ that the staff 
predicted such measures would produce, but included discussion of the political context within which the 
government had resorted to these measures. In New Zealand’s case, this context involved: (1) the failure 
of an attempt to negotiate a social consensus with trade unions, whereby income tax cuts would have 
been exchanged for wage moderation; (2) the negative consequences that wage and price controls would 
have for the ability of existing institutions to function effectively; and (3) the likelihood of declining public 
acceptance of the controls over time (IMF, 1983a).  
The Fund’s overall advice on institutional reforms in New Zealand peaked in the mid-1980s. New 
Zealand seemed to be ripe for an ‘IMF friendly’ policy revolution in 1984 following a currency crisis, the 
election of a new Labour government more receptive to the Fund’s advice on institutional change, and 
with the New Zealand Treasury firmly in favor of economic liberalization (see McKinnon, 2003: Ch. 8). In a 
remarkably short period of policy revolution, New Zealand adopted many of the institutional reforms that 
the Fund had been promoting for the previous ten years, leading the Fund to praise the government for 
having ‘embarked on a courageous and enlightened course in setting economic policy’ (IMF, 1985a). Key 
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changes included the liberalization of trade protections, the adoption of flexible interest rates and a 
floating exchange rate regime, reduction of the budget deficit, and a shift in fiscal policy away from the 
taxation of income and towards consumption. During this period New Zealand turned to the Fund for 
extensive advice based on its comparative policy knowledge. This is indicated by New Zealand’s formal 
requests for ‘technical assistance’ from the Fund on the design and implementation of a new goods and 
services tax (IMF, 1984a, 1985b) and for a wide-ranging review by the Fund of the functions, operations, 
and goals of its Inland Revenue Department (IMF, 1988a). As the Director representing New Zealand 
noted to the Fund’s Executive Board, the country’s policy reforms ‘conform very closely with the approach 
that the Fund has advocated in recent consultations’ (IMF, 1985c). 
In Australia, the Fund’s advice on reforming tax and monetary institutions largely followed a similar 
trend to its advice in New Zealand, but the frequency of ‘IMF friendly’ policies in the Fund’s overall advice 
to Australia remained consistently below New Zealand’s level during the late 1970s and 1980s (see 
Figure 2). Like New Zealand, the frequency of the Fund’s advice peaked in the half decade following the 
election of a new Labor government in 1983 that appeared to be more receptive to elements of the Fund’s 
advice, especially on monetary reform to enhance institutional efficiency (IMF, 1985d). The Fund showed 
great interest in the Price and Incomes Accord that the new government put in place to secure the 
cooperation of trade unions, businesses, and social welfare bodies in moderating wage claims to avoid an 
inflationary spiral. While noting the difficulty of sustaining a ‘consensual’ approach in Australia over time, 
the Fund’s Executive Board nonetheless gave the government credit for developing a novel mechanism in 
an attempt to progress beyond the limits of Australia’s historical pattern of industrial conflict. Significantly, 
several directors observed that there was no a priori reason why such a social compact could not be 
successful (IMF, 1985e), despite the recent failure of the New Zealand government to negotiate a similar 
agreement with trade unions. This runs counter to the Fund’s apparent preference (and the conventional 
wisdom in the academic literature on the Fund) for the exclusive use of market mechanisms such as 
flexible interest rates and exchange rates to manage inflationary expectations, and indicates the Fund’s 
support for an ‘IMF friendly’ policy mix to be recombined with domestic policy innovations through 
bricolage. 
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Following a decline in Australia’s economic performance, with rising inflation and a deteriorating 
balance of payments, the consistency of the Fund’s advice for further ‘IMF friendly’ institutional change 
spiked upwards in 1989. While still not directly critical of the government’s preference for a negotiated 
settlement of wage claims and the setting of tax rates, the Fund urged the government to adopt a better 
‘policy mix’ that could prove more sustainable in enhancing institutional efficiency over time. In particular, 
the Fund viewed Australia as having a relatively low share of revenue derived from consumption taxes, 
and advised the government to reorient taxation away from income toward consumption. The Fund also 
encouraged the government to reduce tariff rates further, to stabilize and then reduce public debt, and, 
while cautious about the short-term effects of exchange rate depreciation, to allow the exchange rate to 
adjust to ‘real shocks’ over the long term, with central bank intervention restricted to smoothing 
‘temporary’ exchange rate fluctuations (IMF, 1989a). 
 
Policy recombinations 
In the cases of New Zealand and Australia, the key push from the Fund for a shift from import licenses 
and other quantitative trade restrictions to tariffs came in the mid- to late-1970s and early 1980s. While 
the push for tariff reduction was a constant refrain from both the Fund staff and the Executive Board, by 
the mid-1990s both countries had removed the majority of their tariffs and the Fund’s advice was geared 
toward maintaining the existing policy orientation rather than seeking to shift governments to a new policy 
trajectory. Similarly, once each state embraced ‘IMF friendly’ reforms such as a flexible exchange rate 
regime and liberalized interest rates, further reforms in these areas did not form a large part of their policy 
dialogue with the Fund.  
In its 1990 consultation with Australia, for example, the Fund noted that the government had acted on 
some of its previous concerns and that policymakers now agreed with the Fund on other elements of its 
advice, indicating that the Fund was now dealing with ‘sympathetic interlocutors’ in the country’s 
policymaking community (Woods, 2006: 73). This included agreement between the Fund and Australian 
officials on the limited economic benefits of using monetary policy to drive down the exchange rate to 
enhance trade competitiveness or reducing interest rates to stimulate investment. The Fund therefore 
urged Australia to ‘stay the course’ to continue to benefit from institutional reforms, as well as to establish 
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the government’s policy credibility and thus anchor economic actors’ expectations as they adjusted to a 
new ‘IMF friendly’ institutional environment (IMF, 1990a). Notably, in both Australia and New Zealand the 
Fund framed its advice as offering a way for governments to send a confidence-boosting signal to 
domestic and international audiences, especially with the Fund’s advice for urgent action to reduce 
budget deficits in the late 1980s and early 1990s (IMF, 1987, 1992). 
One component of the Fund’s advice on increasing institutional efficiency continued to be pushed 
vigorously long after the previous policy trajectory had changed – the reduction of income taxes. The 
Fund continued to prompt Australia and New Zealand to reduce their ‘excessively high’ marginal tax 
thresholds and rates in order to ‘improve the incentives for saving and employment’ (IMF, 1998), and 
urged policymakers to align the top rate of income tax in each country with the company tax rate to 
diminish the incentives for tax avoidance (IMF, 2002). However, we should be cautious about seeing the 
IMF’s clear advocacy for tax reform as proof of a ‘neoliberal’ agenda on low tax. Here it is worth noting 
that the Fund warned New Zealand against its plans for income tax cuts in 1997 (IMF, 1997a). 
Furthermore, the Fund advised against tax cuts for the next two years in its discussions with New Zealand 
officials in May and June 1999 (IMF, 1999), in the run up to a November election where tax cuts versus 
an income tax rise to pay for an increase in social spending was a major issue of political contention 
(Broome, 2007). 
The main divergence in the Fund’s advice on taxation reforms between Australia and New Zealand in 
the 1990s resulted from the Fund’s promotion of a general consumption tax in Australia, which New 
Zealand had adopted with the Fund’s advice in the 1980s (IMF, 1996b, 1997b). Once Australia eventually 
introduced a Goods and Services Tax in the late 1990s, and both countries adopted and gradually 
achieved the objective of decreasing public debt, the advice for ‘IMF friendly’ institutional change on tax 
and monetary policy that the Fund developed over the period of this study was well-established. The 
Fund’s ongoing dialogue with these countries from the mid-1990s mostly revolved around the promotion 
of two aims. First, the recombination of fiscal and monetary policies to achieve more efficient outcomes in 
the context of specific political goals; and, second, encouraging new governments (in 1996 in Australia 
and in 1999 in New Zealand) to maintain an ‘IMF friendly’ institutional framework.  
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IV: THE IMF AND THE NORDIC ECONOMIES 
 
Unlike Australia and New Zealand in the early 1970s, the Fund viewed Sweden and Denmark as 
comparatively ‘open’ economies (cf. Katzenstein, 1985: Ch. 2). The agricultural sector aside, the Nordic 
economies at the start of this study maintained a low level of tariff protection for most sectors of the 
economy. The only context in which tariffs are mentioned in the Fund’s policy dialogue with Denmark is 
when the Fund praises Denmark for maintaining a liberal trading regime, within its European Community 
(EC) obligations, despite facing deteriorating terms of trade in the 1970s and early 1980s (IMF, 1975, 
1984b). In Sweden, the Fund also commended the government’s support of trade openness and its low 
level of tariff protections (IMF, 1983c), while encouraging policymakers to reduce or remove remaining 
tariffs on textiles and agriculture in the mid-1980s (IMF, 1986a). 
 In significant respects, the Fund viewed the Danish and Swedish economies through an 
EC template that led to an emphasis on institutional change in a manner quite different to the Australasian 
economies. That the Fund viewed these states through an EC template (and that the EC is the basis for 
comparison for Sweden even before the country joined the European Union in 1995) rather than a 
‘Nordic’ template is itself of interest (especially given the emphasis within the region on similarities 
between economies, see Mjøset, 1987). It illustrates how the Fund saw the EC as a project unto itself, 
choosing to stress how Denmark and Sweden should behave according to EC benchmarks, rather than to 
Nordic benchmarks. This also contradicts the notion of a universal IMF programmatic discourse to 
enhance institutional efficiency in a country’s taxation and monetary architecture.  
For example, while the Fund wanted Denmark and Sweden to ‘broaden’ income taxation by reducing 
the top marginal rates and thresholds like Australia and New Zealand, income tax policies in Denmark 
and Sweden were specifically assessed against an EC template (IMF, 1981b, 1988b, 1997c). Unlike the 
Australasian economies, the Fund viewed the Nordic economies as already having overly high rates of 
indirect consumption taxes – again in comparison with the EC average. While the Fund saw Denmark as 
a high income tax country ‘by international standards’, Fund staff emphasized in 1989 that Denmark had 
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a rate of indirect taxation that far exceeded most other EC countries, and was unique in setting VAT at a 
single rate while most other EC economies set VAT at two or more levels (IMF, 1989b). On monetary 
institutions, Denmark remained within the European Monetary System during the 1980s, while Sweden 
pegged the krona to a basket of currencies after it left the European Currency Snake in August 1977 and 
devalued the krona by 10 per cent. When the Nordic economies made it clear to the Fund that they would 
continue to pursue stable exchange rates within a semi-fixed exchange rate regime, the Fund voiced 
support for this policy, and encouraged governments to use a fixed exchange rate to stabilize inflationary 
expectations and to secure the confidence of international and domestic audiences in their policy 
intentions (IMF, 1989b).  
Policy revolutions 
The frequency with which the Fund’s advice to Denmark matched an ‘IMF friendly’ policy mix peaked on 
three occasions over the period of our study: in the late 1970s, in the mid-1980s, and in the mid-1990s 
(see Figure 3). In 1977, the Fund stepped up its advocacy of a policy revolution to implement institutional 
change to cope with deteriorating economic performance, with the country suffering from a ballooning 
current account deficit, stagnant growth, and weak domestic investment. The Fund staff supported moves 
to raise indirect taxes to dampen consumer demand for imports and for flexible interest rates to constrain 
inflation, while the Executive Board also encouraged Denmark to lower income taxes, pay down public 
debt, and adopt a more flexible exchange rate regime to aid external adjustment and international 
economic integration (IMF, 1978b, 1978c).  
The next peak in the content of Fund advice in the mid-1980s followed several years of economic 
reform under a new Conservative government elected in 1982 (Mjøset, 1987: 446). Here the advice of the 
Fund centered on the need for Denmark to push forward with reform of the tax system, to lower income 
tax rates and to eliminate tax deductions to improve individual incentives and private savings. The Fund 
advised Denmark to achieve tax reform through lower public spending, and to gradually move toward 
achieving a ‘structural budget surplus’ to compensate for low levels of private savings and lower public 
debt (compared with a budget deficit that reached 9 per cent of GDP in 1982, Gaard and Kieler, 2005: 5). 
As with the other countries in this study, the Fund explicitly framed its advice as a way for Denmark to 
send a positive signal to an international audience, with Fund staff arguing that achieving a structural 
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budget surplus would shore up the country’s credit rating in financial markets. The Fund staff also 
compared the country’s current account balance with those of other EC countries, and suggested that 
Denmark’s current account would have to converge with EC trends to avoid undermining the fixed 
exchange rate regime (IMF, 1986b). Denmark implemented some of the Fund’s advice on tax reforms in 
1987 by reducing the tax deductibility of mortgage interest payments to increase savings incentives, with 
significant political, economic, and social fallout. Policymakers recombined this ‘IMF friendly’ move with 
the ‘potato diet’ policy shift the state had embarked upon in 1986, which strengthened existing 
administrative controls over mortgage credit (Gaard and Kieler, 2005: 8). The last peak in Fund advice to 
Denmark occurred in the mid-1990s, but this can mostly be accounted for by the Fund’s renewed drive for 
Denmark to shift the fiscal balance to indirect taxation (IMF, 1995).  
The four peaks in the frequency of our ‘IMF friendly’ policy mix in the Fund’s dialogue with Sweden 
were in 1981, 1983, 1986, and 1993 (see Figure 4). In 1983, the Fund staff strongly recommended a 
policy revolution, advising Sweden to broaden income taxes, liberalize interest rates, and reduce public 
debt, while Executive Directors added a recommendation for a floating exchange rate reform (IMF, 1983c, 
1983d). This advice followed several years of large current account deficits, large budget deficits, high 
inflation, and falling levels of domestic savings, leading to the election of a new Social Democrat 
government in 1982 (Mjøset, 1987: 446). While previous governments had responded to economic 
difficulties by expanding public borrowing to fund increases in spending and to maintain domestic 
economic activity, the rapid rise in public debt and growing budget deficits led the Fund to call for 
immediate fiscal retrenchment and institutional reform over the medium-term to put the state back on a 
fiscally sustainable setting. Put bluntly, the Fund argued that Sweden could no longer afford its prized 
welfare state, and instead needed to pare back social transfers and industry subsidies, reduce income 
taxes, and hold down wages to regain corporate profitability and improve its international competitiveness 
(IMF, 1983c, 1983d). Within Sweden, academic economists and, increasingly, policymakers gradually 
made a ‘neoliberal ideational shift’ constructed around the notion that an excessively large public sector 
was a policy problem (Blyth, 2001: 17). 
The Fund saw Sweden in the early 1980s as a recalcitrant state, unwilling to face the economic 
realities of the ‘brave new world’ of the post-Bretton Woods era and initially unresponsive to the Fund’s 
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call for a policy revolution to improve its economic performance. In the second peak in the Fund’s advice 
for an ‘IMF friendly’ policy revolution in 1986, previous governments received harsh criticism from the 
Fund, with the staff judging that ‘Sweden’s tardiness in adjusting to the two major oil price increases of 
the 1970s was responsible for weak economic performance in the decade to 1982’ (IMF, 1986a). 
Sweden’s response was a ‘November Revolution’ in 1985 to deregulate domestic credit markets, 
liberalizing bank interest rates and removing all ceilings on loans (Svensson, 2002: 200).  
Similar to Denmark, Sweden maintained a fixed exchange rate regime during the 1980s, albeit with 
large discrete adjustments such as a 10 per cent devaluation in 1981 and a further 16 per cent 
devaluation the following year (Anderson, 1990: 196). The size of Sweden’s 1982 devaluation was 
opposed by other Nordic finance ministers and central bank governors as well as by Fund staff and the 
managing director, Jacques de Larosière, which prompted the new government to modify its original plan 
to devalue the krona by 20 per cent (Boughton, 2001: 111). Against the advice of the Fund for a single 
digit devaluation, this action led to an Executive Board decision to hold ‘special consultations’ with 
Sweden, with four IMF staff members visiting the country for a week of talks with officials in November 
1982. This unprecedented situation for a non-borrowing member state was resolved in a restricted 
session of the Executive Board on 22 December 1982 (IMF, 1982), after the Fund staff urged the 
Swedish minister of finance, Kjell-Olof Feldt, to write to the managing director detailing a policy strategy to 
mitigate the potential adverse effects of the devaluation on neighboring countries. Feldt agreed to do so 
on the condition that it would be a personal letter, so it could not be used against the government by 
opposition parties (Boughton, 2001: 112-13), which indicates the salience of our point that the Fund’s 
policy dialogue can resonate with a domestic audience in Western states. 
Sweden’s fixed exchange rate regime was abruptly abandoned in November 1992 following a major 
currency crisis. In contrast to our ‘IMF friendly’ ideal type, the Fund advised Sweden to decrease VAT in 
1993 to converge with EC countries, but the same year saw the most recent peak in the frequency of an 
‘IMF friendly’ policy mix in the Fund’s dialogue with Sweden. The focus here was almost solely on 
monetary reform, as the country faced what the Fund called ‘its worst economic crisis since the 1930s’, 
encompassing a series of speculative attacks against the Swedish krona, declining economic output, the 
highest level of unemployment in the post-WWII era, an increasing fiscal deficit, and structural problems 
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in the banking system. The Fund saw these serious difficulties as resulting from structural defects in the 
institutional architecture of the state, especially the high level of public expenditure that required a 
‘cripplingly high level of overall taxation’ and fed a large fiscal deficit. Like the two previous peaks in ‘IMF 
friendly’ advice for Sweden, the Fund framed its advice through an EC template, arguing that Sweden’s 
public spending had well exceeded an affordable level, and that social transfer payments were 
‘substantially out of line’ with those in the EC (IMF, 1993).  
 
Policy recombinations 
In comparison with either Australia or New Zealand, the content of the Fund’s advice to Denmark and 
Sweden on taxation and monetary reform was more stable over the thirty-year period of our study. Both 
the Fund staff and the Executive Board focused much of their advice on continuing to encourage the 
Nordic economies to broaden income taxes, and to reduce public debt once it began to increase rapidly 
from the late 1970s. Following discussions about a floating exchange rate reform that surrounded 
Denmark’s entry to the European Monetary System in 1979, the Fund subsequently endorsed the 
country’s fixed exchange rate regime for the krone as an appropriate policy mix for Denmark. Over time 
the staff concluded that the fixed exchange rate had ‘served Denmark well, and… should continue to 
guide monetary policy’, so long as the government maintained a tight fiscal policy and recombined its 
policy mix by adopting more flexible labour market institutions (IMF, 1991b). Within the Danish ‘negotiated 
economy’ from the mid-1980s through to the early-1990s, consensus-building among trade unions, 
employer associations, and the state fostered a new attitude towards ‘structural competitiveness’ in the 
world economy (Pedersen, 2006), followed by innovative reforms to Denmark’s labor institutions and 
fiscal consolidation (IMF, 2006). By the end of the 1990s, when the level of public debt had declined and 
diminished in frequency as a key concern of the Fund, only the level of income taxation among the ‘IMF 
friendly’ policy mix remained as an outlying reform issue (which had remained relatively stable over time, 
see Figure 3).  
 After the peaks in its advice to Sweden during periods of policy revolution in 1981--3 and 
1986, the Fund sought to gain greater policy recombination at the end of the 1980s, especially the 
recombination of the fixed exchange rate regime with a decline in public expenditure and income taxation 
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(IMF, 1990b). Following the next period of policy revolution in the early 1990s, when the fixed exchange 
rate regime was abandoned and the krona’s value substantially depreciated, the Fund again encouraged 
policy recombination, arguing that the level of public debt would have to be brought down in order to 
stabilize the currency and to allow a reduction in high interest rates. Sweden continued to be compared 
with EC countries when the Fund looked at its high level of social spending, and the Fund noted that 
despite official economic statements from the government that emphasized the importance of reducing 
public debt and embracing the principle of tax reduction, actual budget measures agreed in the mid-1990s 
provided for tax increases (IMF, 1994).  
 
V: CONCLUSIONS: THE ROLE OF THE IMF IN SMALL OPEN ECONOMIES 
 
The Fund spends a great deal of its time assessing and learning from institutional change in its member 
states. For Western states the Fund is not a policy enforcer. It does provide Western states with 
comparative knowledge on the experience of implementing institutional change, all seen through what we 
have called ‘associational templates’ and its favored economic policy orientations. The Fund’s capacity to 
learn and act as a source of knowledge is particularly important for small open economies that are 
especially sensitive to changes in the international political economy. In an era of globalization such 
economies must adapt to prosper, and, for good or bad, the Fund has assisted these economies with 
policy advice. This article demonstrates how ‘seeing like the IMF’ provides an insight into how the Fund 
relates to Western states, how the Fund’s advice has changed in recent decades, and how looking 
through the Fund’s eyes allows one to map institutional change over time within a comparative context to 
understand how reform has been seen by the same actor. We also demonstrate that the Fund plays more 
than one role in giving advice; it acts as a diffuser of technical knowledge, a soothsayer to audiences in 
the international political economy, and a weapon to be used by domestic political audiences. In sum, we 
have made four suggestive arguments here about the Fund’s role in Western states: 
 
1. The Fund is useful to states as a source of comparative knowledge on policy reform and as a 
diffuser of institutional innovations. 
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2. The Fund sees economies through a number of associational templates rather than blindly 
promoting institutional convergence. 
3. The Fund’s advice is most likely to have a visible influence during periods of uncertainty, crisis, or 
below average economic performance; but it continues to nudge states to recombine their policy 
mix on an ongoing basis.  
4. The Fund’s advice is most likely to shape the thinkability of alternative economic reforms that 
policymakers choose from, rather than simply determining the direction of change. 
 
While we do find that the Fund uses ‘associational templates’, our interviewees confirmed a point, already 
suggested Bessma Momani (2006: 265), that Western states would prefer for the Fund to adopt a more 
OECD-like process of surveillance and consultation to become more directly driven by the specific policy 
interests of individual states. Further research may develop insight into how the Fund, normally 
considered in the same breath with neoliberal policy homogenization, actively seeks to tinker with 
Western economies to enhance their institutional efficiency. Such findings have important comparative 
lessons not only for Western states, but also for ‘emerging market’ and ‘frontier’ economies that are 
considered to be on the receiving end of Western-style institutional convergence. In closing, looking 
through the eyes of the IMF is useful to not only trace the policy decisions made, but also to gain some 
insight on why alternative options were not taken. Discovering ‘non-decisions’, as Susan Strange (1988: 
22) put it, is a useful corrective to an overly path dependent view of an economy and can expose the 
sources of change in the international political economy. 
 
NOTES 
1 Our special thanks go out to Madonna Gaudette, Clare Huang, Premela Isaacs, and Jean Marcoyeux in 
the International Monetary Fund Archives, Washington D.C., for their research assistance during our 
numerous visits to the Fund.  We thank Fund policy staff and the staff of the macro-policy branches of the 
New Zealand Treasury, the Australian Treasury, and the Danish Ministry of Finance for generously 
affording us time for interviews. We also thank three anonymous reviewers for RIPE, as well as Manuela 
Moschella and John Ravenhill for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. The views 
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expressed in this article are those of the authors, and do not represent the views of the Fund or national 
officials. 
 
2 Our thanks to a staff member of the Macroeconomic Policy Branch in the New Zealand Treasury for 
stressing this point.  
 
3 For example, during the interview period in Denmark, the Fund was actively learning from the Danish 
government about its policy experiment in ‘flexisecurity’, which has already roused interest from other 
member states as a potential policy model for emulation (IMF, 2006). This example is especially 
significant given that the Fund is commonly associated with the diffusion of ‘neoliberal’ economic policies, 
while ‘flexicurity’ is an employment system that seeks to mitigate, not heighten, social risk. 
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Figure 1: IMF Friendly Advice to New Zealand on Taxation and Monetary Reform
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Figure 2: IMF Friendly Advice to Australia on Taxation and Monetary Reform
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Figure 3: IMF Friendly Advice to Denmark on Taxation and Monetary Reforms
-4
0
4
8
12
16
20
24
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
Years
F
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
Tax
Money
IMF overall
 
 33 
Figure 4: IMF Friendly Advice to Sweden on Taxation and Monetary Reforms
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